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THE IMPACT OF ADVANCE NOTICE:  
A COMMENT ON A STUDY BY NORD AND TING  
JOHN T. ADDISON, DOUGLAS A. FOX, and CHRISTOPHER J. RUHM*  
IN their analysis of the effects of advance 
notification of plant closings, Nord and 
Ting (ILR Review, July 1991) claim that 
much can be expected of current legisla-
tion that mandates a 60-day prenotifica-
tion standard because the outcomes of vol-
untary arrangements,  in an interval  
preceding implementation of the legisla-
tion, point to substantial reductions in both 
joblessness and earnings losses for workers 
given over two months' warning of their 
impending layoff. They also suggest that 
many of the disparate results reported in 
the earlier plant closing literature reflect 
the inability to distinguish between formal 
and informal notice on the basis of the 1984 
and 1986 Displaced Worker Surveys.1  
The empirical analysis presented in this 
comment focuses exclusively on the au-
thors' "unemployment" results.2 Using a 
* John T. Addison is Professor of Economics, 
University of South Carolina, and Visiting Professor, 
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universitat Münster; Douglas 
A. Fox is Assistant Professor of Economics, Penn 
State University—Shenango; and Christopher J. 
Ruhm is Associate Professor of Economics, Univer-
sity of North Carolina—Greensboro. 
1. Two other studies, Addison and Portugal (this 
Review) and Ruhm (1992), have also analyzed the 
relation between advance notice and post-displace-
ment joblessness, using the 1988 Displaced Worker 
Survey. Earlier work is summarized in Addison and 
Portugal (this Review, and 1991). 
2  We deliberately restricted our focus in this 
manner because of additional problems attaching to 
the authors' wage change analysis. First, there is no 
clear behavioral link between the unemployment 
analysis and the earnings development analysis. To 
the extent that the avoidance of unemployment 
finding underpins the beneficial earnings result, it 
would appear logical to have tested, among other 
things, whether those notified workers without any 
intervening spell of joblessness "outperformed" their 
notified counterparts with positive spells. Second, it  
similar sample and reduced form probit 
model (see next section), we do not obtain 
confirmation of Nord and Ting's (N&T's) 
finding that written notice exceeding two 
months reduces the likelihood of experi-
encing a positive spell of joblessness. Once 
we restore to the sample two groups that 
we believe must be included in it (non- 
notified workers and non-employed work-
ers) and introduce informal notice as a 
separate regressor, we do obtain the N&T 
result for plant closings, but not for other 
sources of layoff. Disaggregation of the 
samples by gender and broad occupation 
produces further changes in the pattern 
of results. These findings indicate that the 
estimated notification effects are ex -
tremely sensitive to small changes in the 
sample and model specification and that 
considerable caution is required in draw-
ing policy conclusions. 
W e  a l s o  f i n d  t h a t  o n c e  a  w o r k e r  
experiences some unemployment, ex -
tended intervals of written notice do not 
"produce" reductions in the spell length of 
joblessness. For a sample that closely 
approximates that used by N&T, we do 
observe an insignificant negative impact of 
extended notice on joblessness; but for a 
sample that includes non-notified and 
non-employed workers the coefficients are 
positive, significantly so in the case of the 
1990 DWS. This result does not, of course, 
mean that  long notice causes higher  
may be misleading to focus on wage changes (rather 
than wage levels) if notice is systematically provided 
to workers with high or low wages. Third, selection 
problems may be particularly severe because of the 
inclusion of recently displaced workers in the sample, 
a relatively small proportion of whom will have 
secured reemployment at the survey date. 
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666 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW  
unemployment; rather, it hints at the 
endogeneity of notice, a phenomenon 
N&T fail to consider. 
N&T's suggestion that the information 
(on written notice) contained in the latest 
Displaced Worker Surveys may help clar-
ify divergent findings from past surveys 
does not receive support in the results 
reported here, which point to notification 
effects that depend critically on sample 
stratification. As before, the task remains 
one of identifying and explaining the 
disparate effects of notice. 
Methodology 
We deploy essentially the same probit 
model as do N&T to ensure maximum 
conformity between the two sets of re-
duced form regressions.3 Thus, twenty of 
the independent variables deployed here 
are identical to those used by N&T. 
Changes were made to just three of the 
variables. Specifically, the dummies for 
broad occupational status (BLUE COLLAR) 
and industry (MANUFACTURING) were de- 
fined at the point of displacement rather 
than at the survey date, and instead of 
using the displaced worker's state unem-
ployment rate averaged from the date of 
displacement we substituted the relevant 
state unemployment rate obtaining at the 
time of displacement.4 Otherwise, the 
form of the estimating equation is un-
changed. It follows that the principal 
difference between our analysis and 
N&T's has to do with sample construction. 
We estimated the probit equation for six 
separate samples. First, we use the N&T 
3 We are indebted to Nord and Ting for supplying 
us with copies of their programs. 
4 To the extent that occupational status influences 
post-displacement outcomes (for example, via its 
effect on reservation wages and specific human 
capital), it is the pre-displacement, rather than the 
post-separation, occupation that is of key impor-
tance. The authors' use of the unemployment rate 
averaged from the date of displacement is also 
dubious because the typical worker was displaced 2.5 
years before the survey date but was out of work for 
less than one year. Thus, the initial, rather than the 
averaged, unemployment rate is a more meaningful 
indicator of economic conditions confronting the 
displaced worker during the period of job search.  
sample [model (0], which includes only 
those workers who responded in the 
affirmative to the broad notice question in 
the DWS and who were reemployed in 
January 1988. This sample thus includes 
reemployed workers who received either 
informal notice (INFONOT) or one of the 
three lengths of written notice (WRITNOT), 
WRITNOT2, WRITNOT3) but excludes the  
most logical control group, namely, those 
who did not learn of or otherwise antici-
pate their displacement. Thus, in N&T's 
estimating equation the informally noti-
fied constitute the omitted category. 
Second, we add back to this sample all 
those respondents who never found work 
in the wake of displacement [model (ii)], 
thereby including both the economically 
active and inactive. Third, we add in those 
who were not notified of their impending 
displacement [model (iii)]. This third sam-
ple is our preferred one for the obvious 
reason that in seeking to assess the impact 
of notice on the likelihood of observing a 
positive spell of joblessness, the most 
logical reference category is the non- 
notified rather than the informally noti-
fied. Accordingly, the probit now includes, 
in addition to the three formal notice 
variables, informal notice as a separate 
regressor, the non-notified being the refer-
ence category. Fourth, workers displaced 
from construction jobs and the armed 
forces were excluded [model (iv)], to 
ascertain the sensitivity of the results to 
the inclusion of certain groups for whom 
the meaning of displacement is opaque. In 
what follows, the results from our pre-
ferred specification [model (iii)] will re-
ceive emphasis. 
The sample in models (i) through (iv) is 
made up of workers displaced by reason 
of plant closings. This source of displace-
ment accounts for around 50% of dis-
placed workers, the balance comprising 
those permanently laid off either because 
of slack work (analogous to mass layoffs) 
or because of abolition of shift or position. 
We see no reason to examine plant 
closings alone—each group receives the 
various types of notice and each is covered. 
by current legislation mandating 60 days' 
notice, subject to a basic employment size 
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threshold and magnitude of layoff con-
straint—and so our two final specifications 
apply the sample inclusion criteria of 
models (iii) and (iv) to workers displaced 
by slack work and abolition of shift or 
position. 
Each model is estimated for both the 
1988 and the 1990 DWS, the latter having 
recently become available. In addition, a 
number of disaggregations of the data are 
attempted to ascertain the sensitivity of 
our basic results to sample construction. 
Finally, although N&T do not provide 
results for the duration of post-displace-
ment joblessness, simply noting that "writ-
ten advance notification had no significant 
impact on the length of unemployment 
spells of dislocated workers" (fn. 10, p. 
688) (emphasis added), we also estimate a 
parametric jobless duration equation us-
ing the flexible, three-parameter extended 
generalized gamma variant of the acceler-
ated failure time model (Addison and 
Portugal 1987).5 
Findings 
Table 1 provides summary findings for 
the reduced form probit equations. (Full 
results are available from the authors on 
request.) The upper panel of the table 
gives results for specifications that identify 
the three categories of written notice 
alone, the reference category being the  
5 The dependent variable in this exercise requires 
modest elaboration. The duration measure is derived 
from responses to the question in the DWS asking 
displaced workers how many weeks passed before 
they found a job. Replies to this question, in addition 
to providing information on the (completed) spell of 
unemployment, also encompass a "never found 
work" response. Such workers are included, and 
their joblessness top coded at 99 weeks, if they were 
displaced within the first three years of the survey 
(1983 to 1985 in the case of the 1988 DWS and 1985 
to 1987 for the 1990 DWS). Workers displaced in the 
last two years of each survey, however, were included 
only if they were reported as currently unemployed 
on the basis of the labor force status question in the 
parent CPS. lf so, their unemployment duration, 
necessarily incomplete spells, was used in the 
duration analysis. We experimented with various 
ways of treating persons who reported that they had 
never found work, but the results were insensitive to 
the alternatives considered.  
informally notified in models (i) and (ii) 
and the informally notified plus the 
non-notified in models (iii) through (iv). 
The lower panel of the table includes 
informal notice as a separate regressor, as 
is (we argue) more appropriate. 
The most obvious finding is that the 
basic N&T result does not obtain for the 
1988 DWS, using a similar sample and 
their specification of the notice variables. 
Indeed, we obtain results indicating that 
notice intervals of greater than two 
months' duration "work" for the 1988 
DWS only when we add in the non- 
employed and the informally notified. 
There is even less evidence of a beneficial 
effect of lengthy notice in the 1990 DWS: 
the coefficients on WRITNOT3 are never 
statistically significant and are frequently 
positive rather than negative. In fact, as 
can be seen from the lower panel of the 
table,  the coefficients on WRITNOT3 are 
better determined for plant closings, in 
the case of the 1988 DWS, once informal 
notice is included as a separate regressor. 
Informal notice is also highly significant, 
and remains so for the 1990 DWS, for 
which WRITNOT3 is no longer significant. 
What is true for plant closings does not 
carry over to other layoffs. For workers 
dislocated by slack work and abolition of 
shift or position, the longest notice inter-
val is nowhere significant. Rather, it is 
notice of between one and two months' 
duration that is associated with a reduced 
likelihood of observing positive spells of 
joblessness. As noted above, informal 
notice is always significant at conventional 
levels. These findings provide strong 
evidence that the estimated notice coeffi-
cients are sensitive to plausible changes in 
the model specification and sample inclu-
sion criteria. 
We next consider the relationship be-
tween advance notice and the duration of 
post-displacement joblessness. Table 2 
shows the results of estimating the ex-
tended generalized gamma accelerated 
failure time model. As suggested by N&T, 
extended notice fails to significantly miti-
gate the subsequent joblessness of workers 
displaced by plant closings when the 
non-notified and non-employed are ex-  
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670 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW  
cluded. But note that, as the sample is 
widened, we find that the coefficients on 
WRITNOT3 become positive, quite large, 
and—in the case of the 1990 DWS—  
statistically significant. This does not imply 
that the longest interval of written notice 
extends the unemployment duration of 
workers displaced by plant closings. 
Rather, the results hint at the presence of 
unobserved characteristics that are posi-
tively correlated with both receipt of 
extended notice and lengthened jobless 
spells, and caution against assigning a 
causal interpretation to reduced form 
estimates. In any event, the findings 
weaken N&T's conclusion that mandatory 
notice would substantially reduce post- 
displacement joblessness. 
Note, too, the uniformally negative 
coefficients on informal notice when the 
duration equation is estimated over all 
spells of joblessness, including direct tran-
sitions from employment to employment 
(zero spells).6 In general, no such relation 
is reported for the longest interval of 
notice. 
Further evidence of the fragility of the 
estimated notification effects is evident in 
disaggregation of the data by broad 
occupational status and gender. Results 
for the 1988 DWS are given in Table 3. 
The N&T result appears to hold for 
blue-collar workers and for both genders 
in the case of plant closings. But for other 
layoffs the longest interval of written 
notice is not associated with a significant 
reduction in the probability of observing 
some positive spell of joblessness, with the 
exception of white-collar workers, for 
whom WRITNOT2 is both stronger and 
better determined. On the other hand, the 
coefficients on informal notice are signifi-
cant for white-collar workers and men for 
both sources of displacement, but not for 
blue-collar workers, or women. 
Further disaggregations of the data 
jointly by occupation and gender were also 
estimated. Because of the small number of 
observations on lengthy notice, WRITNOT2 
6 Zero weeks of unemployment were assigned a 
value of .01 week.  
and WRITNOT3 were merged.7 The results 
are provided in the appendix table. Note 
that differences in sample sizes, specifica-
tion of the reduced form probits, and 
grouping of layoff categories limit the 
comparisons that may be drawn between 
the results given in the appendix table and 
those supplied by Addison and Portugal 
(this volume), despite the superficial cor-
respondence between the results for all 
other layoffs in the former and for all 
displaced workers in the latter. 
It can be seen that a further differenti-
ated pattern of results obtains. Longer 
intervals of written notice "work" for 
blue-collar men but not for white-collar 
men in the case of plant closings, whereas 
exactly opposite results are reported for 
all other layoffs. Only for female white- 
collar workers are the results for longer 
intervals of notice "consistent" across 
reasons for displacement. Any suggestion 
that simple compositional effects explain 
the results for blue-collar workers (all 
workers are affected in the case of plant 
closings, but only a subset thereof in cases 
of slack work and abolition of shift or 
position) confronts the obvious difficulty 
that the same does not hold for white- 
collar men. The safest inference, there-
fore, is that the endogeneity of notice 
underpins these very disparate results. 
Unobserved factors are likely to figure 
larger in data disaggregation of this type. 
The principal finding, however, is again 
that the effects of formal notice vary 
greatly across population subgroups. 
Endogeneity of Notice 
N&T treat their reduced form estimates 
of the association between advance notifi-
cation and the probability of experiencing 
post-displacement joblessness as if they 
imply a causal relationship. If voluntary 
notice is provided on a nonrandom basis, 
7 The probit equations could not be estimated for 
blue-collar women despite grouping observations on 
the two longest notice intervals. Specifically, the 
number of (negative) observations (6 for layoffs and 
15 for plant closings) fell below the number of 
independent variables (22, including the constant) 
for this subgroup.  
Addison, John T., Douglas A. Fox, and Christopher J. Ruhm. “The Impact of Advance Notification: A 
Comment On a Study By Nord and Ting,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 45, No. 4, July 1992, 
665-673. 
Made available courtesy of CORNELL UNIVERSITY/ILR REVIEW. 
 
ADVANCE NOTICE: A COMMENT 671 
 
however, such a causal interpretation is 
likely to be incorrect. Indeed, the fragility 
of estimated notification "effects" strongly 
suggests that advance notice may be 
correlated with unobserved (to the econo-
metrician) factors that influence jobless-
ness. If so, limited information is provided 
by the reduced form models. 
Recent research suggests that lengthy 
written notice is provided endogenously. 
Most pertinent to this comment are stud-
ies by Ruhm (1992) and Jones and Kuhn 
(1991). Ruhm provides evidence indicat-
ing that although persons receiving sub-
stantial written notice have higher proba-
bilities of avoiding joblessness than their 
counterparts surprised by the displace-
ment event, they are also more likely to 
experience lengthy spells of joblessness. 
This result, which is consistent with the 
findings reported here, implies that for-
mally notified workers have lower reem-
ployment hazards after entering unem-
ploy ment  t ha n the i r  no n -not i f ied  
counterparts. It is difficult to reconcile this 
result with any conclusion other than that 
the provision of advance notice is endoge-
nous.8 
Using the Ontario Ministry of Labour 
data set, Jones and Kuhn similarly test for 
and uncover significant evidence of en-
dogenous advance notice for their sample 
8 Ruhm also implements a more technical test that 
provides further evidence of endogeneity.  
of Canadian firms. The key identifying 
information used in their test is the 
variation across firms in the legal mini-
mum notification period, which is a 
function of the size of the layoff. Dura-
tions beyond the legal minimum, however, 
are provided at the discretion of the 
employer. That is to say, inter-firm differ-
ences in the minimum length of notice are 
largely exogenous, whereas intra-firm 
variations are endogenous and likely to 
depend on unobserved characteristics. 
Although this comment has not focused 
on N&T's wage regressions, the nonran-
dom provision of notice is likely to create 
bias in these results as well. In addition, 
earnings and unemployment could inter-
act in important ways that receive little 
attention in N&T's analysis. For example, 
firms voluntarily providing lengthy writ-
ten notice may be more likely than other 
firms to offer additional kinds of displace-
ment assistance in the form of skills 
training and supplemental unemployment 
benefits, inter alia. Workers receiving this 
package of benefits may be quite likely to 
stay unemployed longer, particularly if 
their initial efforts to find new employ-
ment fail, but receive higher reemploy-
ment wages than their counterparts re-
ceiving neither advance notice nor other 
forms of assistance. Yet, however benefi-
cial the voluntary provision of notice in 
such circumstances, without further infor-  
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672 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW  
mation (on the package) one is patently 
unable to rule on the efficacy of manda-
tory notification. 
Conclusions 
The regression estimates obtained by 
Nord and Ting are extremely sensitive to 
plausible (and necessary) changes in the 
model specification. Furthermore, Nord 
and Ting pay inadequate attention to the 
correlation between advance notice and 
unemployment once the jobless spell is 
under way and fail to consider how their 
results might be biased by endogenous 
provision of advance notice. 
Our main findings are as follows. First, 
extended intervals of written notice have 
no discernible effect on the probability of 
avoiding a spell of joblessness for those 
displaced by reason of slack work or 
abolition of a shift or position, and the 
favorable effects observed for plant clos-
ings do not carry over to the 1990 DWS. 
Second, written notice does not reduce the 
length of positive spells of joblessness in 
any of the single equation models and is 
often correlated with increased jobless 
durations. This finding suggests the im-
portance of unobserved characteristics 
associated with the receipt of extended 
notice and underscores  the need for 
caution when formulating policies relating 
to advance notice and job security. Third, 
the more detailed information on notice 
provided in the latest Displaced Worker 
Surveys does not provide a "solution" to 
an earlier literature drawing on the 1984 
and 1986 surveys and, in particular, does 
not explain the strong showing of infor-
mal notice in a number of the models.  
We do not argue that the provision of 
extended notice in private contracts is 
without benefit, merely that the variation  
in observed outcomes clouds any simplistic 
interpretation of its efficacy. The regime 
shift associated with legislating mandated 
notice further muddies the waters, al -
though it is not obvious that the current 
legislation has significantly increased the 
frequency with which notice is provided 
(Addison and Blackburn 1991).  
Nord and Ting are correct in noting 
that the impact of advance notice extends 
beyond jobless duration to encompass 
earnings development. Pending improve-
ments in our understanding of the mech-
anisms through which prenotification fa-
cilitates job finding, however, the link 
between the two parts of their study 
remains tenuous and any (implicit) sugges-
tion that they have provided an integrated 
model of unemployment and earnings 
changes should be resisted. Detailed treat-
ments of the effects of notice on earnings 
(for example, Addison and Fox 1991; 
Ruhm 1991) provide some supporting 
evidence that the longest interval of  
written notice is correlated with higher 
post-displacement wages but show that the 
causal connections leading to this result 
are far more complicated than those 
implied in Nord and Ting's simple re -
duced form estimates. An integrated treat-
ment of earnings and joblessness awaits 
improvement to our understanding of the 
process through which workers obtain 
reemployment. 
At a minimum, considerable caution 
must be exercised in attributing strong 
policy implications to the results of a single 
study. Thus, we consider Nord and Ting's 
concluding statement—"These results 
confirm the appropriateness of the 60-day 
not i f ica t ion pe r iod required by the 
Worker Adjustment and Retaining Notifi-
cation Act of 1988" ( p. 691)—to be both 
premature and overstated. 
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